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ABSTRACT 
MEDIATOR is a negotiation support system (NSS) based on 
evolutionary systems design (ESD) and database-centered implementation. 
It supports negotiations by consensus seeking through exchange of 
information and, where consensus is incomplete, by compromise. The 
negotiation problem is shown --graphically or as relational data in 
matrix form-- in three spaces as a mapping from control space to goal 
space (and through marginal utility functions) to utility space. Within 
each of these spaces the negotiation process is characterized by 
adaptive change, i.e., mappings of group target and feasible sets by 
which these sets are redefined in seekir.g a solution characterized by a 
single-point intersection between them. 
This concept is being implemented in MEDIATOR, a data-based micro- 
mainframe NSS intended to support the players and a human mediator in 
multi-player decision situations. Each player employs private and 
shared database views, using hisfher own micro-computer decision support 
system enhanced with a communications manager to interact with the 
mediator DSS. Sharing of views constitutes exchange of information 
which can lead towards consensus. The human mediator can support 
compromise, as needed, through use of solution concepts and/or 
concession-making procedures in the NSS model base. As a concrete 
example, we demonstrate the use of the system for group car buying 
decisions. 
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1, INTRODUCTION 
Negotiation support systems (NSS)--computer assisted negotiations-- 
provide decision support in problems involving multiple decision makers, 
thus extending decision support systems (DSS)--e.g., see Keen and Scott 
Morton ( 1978 1, Sprague and Carlson ( 1982 ) , Bonczek et a1 . ( 198 1 )--where 
the initial emphasis has been on single decision maker situations. 
In general in NSS we are interested in multiplayer, multicriteria, 
ill-structured, dynamic problems. Shakun (1981a, 1981b, 1986) develops 
evolutionary systems design (ESD) as a methodology for problem 
definition and solution (design) in complex contexts involving 
multiplayer, multicriteria, ill-structured, dynamic problems. In 
particular, in this paper ESD is used as a basis for MEDIATOR, a system 
designed to support negotiations in a setting which we now describe in 
overview form and develop in detail in the sections below. 
1.1. Negotiation Setting Overview 
A group of N players is involved in negotiations. A human mediator 
supports these negotiations and he in turn is supported by the 
negotiation support system, MEDIATOR. The (human) mediator supports 
negotiations by assisting the players in a process of consensus seeking 
within which compromise is possible. Using MEDIATOR, the mediator 
assists in consensus seeking by aiding the players to build a common 
(group) joint problem representation of the negotiations. The 
negotiation problem representation is shown by MEDIATOR--graphically or 
as relational data in matrix form--in three spaces as mappings from 
control space to goal space ( and through marginal utility functions) to 
preference (here utility) space. (In some cases involving risk a fourth 
space, criteria space, can be used between goal space and preference 
space--see Ciordano et al. (1985) and Shakun (1986)). These spaces can 
be redefined while using MEDIATOR. For use of a goals/values referral 
process to redefine goal space see Shakun ( 1981a, 1986). 
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At each stage of the negotiations, the common joint problem 
representation shows the acknowledged degree of consensus (or conflict) 
among the players, i.e., at each stage players may show different 
individual problem representations. The evolution of problem 
representation can be described as a process of consensus seeking-- 
through sharing of views which constitutes exchange of information-- 
within which compromise is possible. The mediator can support 
compromise through use of axiomatic solution concepts and/or concession- 
making procedures in the MEDIATOR model base. Computer display of the 
evolving problems representation can be used to support continued 
consensus seeking. In each space (control, goal and preference) the 
negotiation process represents adaptive change, i.e., mappings of group 
target and feasible sets in seeking a solution--a single point 
intersection between them (Shakun 1985, 1986). 
In the basic scenario as described above, we think of the mediator 
as supporting the negotiations and in turn being supported by MEDIATOR, 
but not himself deciding on them. However, MEDIATOR should also be 
useful in compulsory arbitration where the mediator decides (chooses) 
the solution. In some contexts, the mediator can be a group leader, 
e.g., the president of a company, who finally makes a decision supported 
by MEDIATOR. In other contexts, MEDIATOR could support the players 
directly without the use of a human mediator. Here we work with the 
basic scenario as noted above. 
1.2. Database-Centered DSS Design Overview 
A number of DSS design strategies have been proposed, including 
those that start from the decision models used, from the user interfaces 
requires, or from a task analysis. In organizations where decisions are 
based on large amounts of existing data, it seems more natural to follow 
a database-centered approach. This method embeds the decision models and 
user interfaces of a DSS in an database management environment which 
provides them with data, stores their execution sequences, and retains 
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their results. A database approach to DSS was first proposed by Donovan 
( 1976) for single-user DSS and later extended by Blanning ( 1984), Jarke 
(1981 ), and others to cover not only the data management but also the 
model management and multiuser aspects of DSS. 
In the negotiation support setting discussed in this paper, the 
database is also used as a communication center among the mediator and 
the players. Besides providing the initial data underlying the problem 
to be solved, the DBMS also manages the evolving group joint problem 
representations. Furthermore, it provides a large number of tools for 
generating this joint problem representation and protecting it against 
unauthorized or erroneous access. 
1.3. Paper Outline 
In the following sections, we develop this negotiation support 
system concept in detail. In section 2 we summarize the single decision 
maker case as background for the group negotiation problem discussed in 
section 3, based on (Shakun, 1985). In section 4 we illustrate the use 
of MEDIATOR by an application to group car buying. The database- 
centered system architecture for MEDIATOR is developed in section 5. 
Section 6 presents concluding remarks. 
2. THE CASE OF ONE DECISION MAKER 
A DSS for MCDM involving one decision maker and applied to car 
buying is discussed in detail in Jacquet-Lagreze and Shakun (1984). 
Consider a set A of strategies (controls, inputs, decisions, choices, 
actions). In the car buying decision, A is the set of available cars 
representable by positive integers in R', car space. Let g be a 
function from A to RP, the p-dimensional real vector space. which 
characterizes outcomes (goals, outputs, consequences, characteristics, 
criteria). In case of cars, the criteria include price, gas 
consumption, space, etc. Then y=g(a) for a&A is a vector of RP 
representing the outputs of a particular input choice, a; g(A) is the 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-85-36 
set of possible outputs representing technologically feasible 
performance. These outputs are generally constrained a priori by 
preliminary goal target Yo information. For example, these constraints 
could be Yo = {~ERP: yi 2 bi, i=l,. . . ,p]. The intersection of Yo and 
g(A) is called g(Ao), a set of a priori admissible outputs. A ~ = ( ~ E A :  
g(a)~Y,] is the corresponding set of a priori admissible inputs. 
In addition to the admisible sets of cars, A, and goals, g(Ao) we 
have a preference structure defined on g(A,). Here we assume a utility 
function u(y) which is nonlinear and additive: 
With the UTA utility assessment procedure (Jacquet-Lagreze and 
Siskos , 1982) implemented in the microcomputer program, PREFCALC 
(Jacquet-Lagreze, 1985), the marginal functions ui(yi) are taken as 
piecewise linear and nondecreasing or nonincreasing. Based on UTA, a 
disaggregation-aggregation learning process involving both wholistic and 
analytical judgments is implemented. Working with a small sample AICAo, 
a decision support system (Jacquet-Lagreze and Shakun, 1984) can aid a 
decision maker in defining his utility function (1). Applying the 
utility function to the set of cars A. results in a ranking of cars 
according to their numerical utilities. The car with the maximum 
utility is the buying decision. Figure 1 shows the criteria space. 
Figure 1 
The technologically feasible set g(A) intersects the a priori goal 
target Yo to give the a priori admissible set g(Ao) = g(A)R yo) which 
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typically in car buying has many points. In order to find a single 
point solution in criteria space, the intersection set g(Ao) must be 
reduced in size. This can be done either by contracting Yo or g(A). 
Since for cars the latter set is fixed at a particular time, we contract 
Yo by using the user's utility function. By maximizing utility, the 
target Yo contracts to evolved goal target Y which has a single point 
intersection (solution) with g(Ao) at point B1 whose preimage in A. is 
the car buying decision (Ignore dotted curves, B2, BC, y2, and yC in 
figure 1 for the moment). 
3. CROUP DECISION MAKING: NEGOTIATIONS 
Assume each decision maker (player) in a group called coalition C 
has worked individually with the single-user DSS procedure outlined in 
section 2. If the same car does not have the highest utility for all 
players there is a conflict. Refering to Figure 1, with two players 
(e.g. husband and wife), if B1 is player 1's output (highest utility) 
solution and B2 is player 2's, there is a conflict. Note geometrically 
that yC, the coalition (group) goal target -- the intersection of the 
goal targets Y' and Y* for players 1 and 2, respectively, i.e. yC = 
y'f2y2 -- has an empty intersection with g(~Co), the group admissible 
output set. In Figure 1, for simplicity g(~Co) = Slg(Aj0) for players j 
= 1, 2 is simply shown as g(Ao). If group goal target yC expands, e.g. . 
by expansion through negotiations of goal targets Y and y2, there could 
be a solution at output point BC, the intersection between expanded yC 
and g(~Co). 
It is clear from our discussion of Figure 1 that the search process 
for a solution involves contracting or expanding sets. By expansion 
(contraction) we mean that some new (old) points are added (dropped) to 
(from) a set; this expansion (contraction) does not preclude dropping 
(adding) some other points from (to) the set. Thus 
expansion/contraction involves a mapping from an original (current) set 
to a new set. For a group C, two sets are subject to 
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expansion/contraction mapping. They are: ( 1 ) g(~C) =g(~), the group 
technologically feasible output set or more precisely the admissible set 
g(~Co)=g(~)Q~Co where Y ~ ~ = Q Y ~ ~ ,  and (2) the group goal target yC =QY~. 
In searching for a solution, i.e., searching for a single point 
intersection between g(~Co) and YC we note the following: 
1. For the group goal target YC, higher utility aspirations (or 
goal demands) by players contract the target; lower utility 
aspirations (expressed in concession making) expand the 
target . Goal target expansion/contraction involves 
negotiations. 
2. For the group admissible technologically feasible set g(~Co), 
axioms can contract the feasible set and new technology can 
expand it. For example, with nondecreasing (or nonincreasing) 
marginal utility functions, the Pareto optimality axiom for 
utilities (Owen, 1982; Harsanyi, 1977; Luce and Raiffa, 1957) 
constrains (contracts) the feasible goal set to the upper 
right boundary in Figure 1 when searching for solutions. New 
technology cars on the market can expand the feasible set. In 
other words, feasible set contraction can employ solution 
concepts involving specification of axioms imposing agreed- 
upon properties on the solution; expansion can involve 
withdrawal of of axioms previously specified or creation of 
new technological inputs. 
The above search focusing on goal space is paralleled in car space 
and utility space because of the mapping from car space to goal space to 
utility space (via the marginal utility functions). Figure 2 shows 
utility space for two players corresponding to the goal space of Figure 
FIGURE 2 
Consider the group utility target = Q u ~  where UJ is player j's 
utility target. In arriving at a solution at point PC = (ul(BC), 
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u2(BC)), the group utility target -- initially uC (initial) based on 
individual player use of the single-user DSS -- has expanded to uC 
(final) intersecting the feasible set at PC. (Ignore other items on 
Figure 2 for the moment). The progress of negotiations, here 
concession-making in goal and utility spaces and corresponding 
concessions in car space can be shown by a DSS either graphically as in 
Figures 1 and 2 or as relational data in matrix form as in Table I. 
TABLE I 
In Table I, car ~EA', = RA~,, the group joint set of a priori 
admissible cars, is specified by name. The goals are: Y1 =C120 is the 
gasoline consumption, liters/lOOKm, at 120 Km/hr; y2= space is in square 
meters; y3=price is in French francs; y4=maximum speed is in kmlhr. 
Utilities ul and u2 are the utilities of players 1 and 2, respectively. 
For exchanging information, the DSS could display the larger set a&hj0 
which includes cars a priori admissible to at least one player. In this 
case, a car inadmissible for player j would be listed as "inadmissible" 
in the utility column u but it conceivably could become admissible in j , 
the course of negotiations. 
Thus, Table I shows a set of 10 cars and their corresponding goal 
and utility values for two players. The utility values ul for player 1 
are taken from Jacquet-Lagreze and Shakun (1984) based on use of the 
single user DSS. For illustration, the utility values u2 for player 2 
are listed in reverse order of those for player 1. In row 1 of Table I, 
we see the goal point B1=(10.48, 7.96, 46700, 176) of Figure 1 and 
utility point PI=( .752, .383) of Figure 2 corresponding to player 1's 
first car choice, Opel. Similarly in row 10 of table I we see 
B ~ =  ( 12.26, 7.8 1 , 68593, 182) , P2= ( .383, .752) corresponding to player 
2's first choice, BMW. Thus, to begin with, player 1's feasible target 
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is defined by row 1; similarly row 10 for player 2. Concession making 
involves players adding additional rows to their respective targets, 
thereby expanding them. Given the symmetry of the situation, the 
solution is likely to be either Visa with PC=( .616, .576) or Golf with 
PC=(.576, .616) or a random choice between them. 
In addition to the above displays, the NSS can show graphically the 
marginal utility functions. For output goal yi, uij(yi) gives the 
marginal utility function of player j. If for a particular i the DSS 
shows both Ui 1 (yi) and ui2(yi) on the same graphical axes, then the two 
players csn compare, exchange information (perhaps leading towards 
consensus) and negotiate on their marginal utility functions. The 
marginal utilities uij can also be included in the relational data of 
Table I by inserting columns uil and ui2 for i=1,2,3,4, i.e., 8 columns 
of the ui inserted, say, between the y4 and u, columns. The DSS could 
display the projection of the relational data of Table I onto goal yi, 
uil and ui2 to enable the players to compare their marginal utility 
values for a particular goal yi. 
If players change their marginal utility functions so that they 
approach one another, the feasible set in utility space approaches a 
positive-sloping 45' line whose highest utility point is the solution, 
PC* (Figure 2) thus achieving consensus. Of course, uC (initial) is 
readily adjusted to uC (adjusted) to give a single point intersection at 
PC*. In other words, in utility space, figure 2, there is a function F: 
PC --> PC*, PI --> PI*, P2 --> P2* mapping the original feasible set to 
points along the dotted straight line with solution at point PC*. uC 
(adjusted) is also shown following the mapping: uC (initial) --> uC 
(adjusted). 
The arrival at a common coalition utility function (through 
exchange of information and negotiation until players1 marginal utility 
functions are identical) means in goal space, Figure 1, that individual 
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playersf goal targets y1 and y2 have become the same. In other words, 
although not dram on Figure 1, now Y' = Y* = yC, the coalition goal 
target which intersects g(~Co) at a solution point BCi whose preiamge in 
car space is the car buying decision. 
In addition to exchanging information and negotiating to expand 
targets, players can consider the use of axioms to contract the feasible 
region, e.g., (1) to a single solution point in utility space--in Figure 
2, Nash axioms (Owen, 1982; Harsanyi, 1977; Luca and Raiffa, 1957) might 
give solution point PC which is accomodated by the mapping: uC (initial) 
- -  6 (final), or ( 2 )  to a constrained set of points (e.g. the Pareto 
optimal set might. be (PI, PC, P21 in Figure 2). The latter could be 
followed by compromise (concessions) to select a single point from this 
set, e.g. PC, or perhaps consensus leading to PC* might be realized. 
4. USING MEDIATOR: APPLICATION TO GROUP CAR BUYING DECISIONS 
As noted in the negotiation setting overview, a human mediator 
supports group negotiations and he in turn is supported by the 
negotiation support system, MEDIATOR. The (human) mediator supports 
negotiations by assisting the players in a process of consensus seeking 
within which compromise is possible. Using MEDIATOR, the mediator 
assists in consensus seeking by aiding the players to build a group 
joint problem representation of the negotiations--in effect, joint 
mappings from control space to goal space (and through marginal utility 
functions) to utility space. 
Assume each decision maker (player) in a group has worked 
individually with the single-user multicriteria DSS as discussed in 
section 2. Using PREFCALC he has established his initial individual 
mappings from control space to goal space (and through the marginal 
utility functions) to utility space. For this illustration of car 
buying we assume a negotiation setting between two players (e.g., 
husband and wife) wherein the players respond positively to the 
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mediator's suggestion that players build a joint problem representation 
with the help of MEDIATOR. 
For the group representation, MEDIATOR uses a common set of 
dimensions-- the union of the individual player dimensions--to define 
group (joint) control, goal and utility spaces. The evolving problem 
representation is shown--graphically or as relational data in matrix 
form--in the three group spaces, as discussed in section 3. 
TABLE I1 
Table I1 shows the initial group mappings from control (car) to 
goal to utility spaces (ignore first and second evolved utilities for 
the moment). Suppose that player 2's initial individual problem 
representation had only three goal dimensions, say y,, y2, and y3, 
whereas player 1's had all four goals. The common set of goal 
dimensions--the union--has all four goals with player 2 placing zero 
weight on y4. Note that in this example there is no conflict in group 
control and goal space, i.e., players have the same individual problem 
representation in these spaces. They only differ in their . 
representations in group utility space as shown under ini tial 
utilities" in Table 11. A look at the initial individual marginal 
utility functions, Figure 3, reveals the underlying preference conflict. 
We consider several scenarios based on play by student/faculty players. 
FIGURE 3 
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4.1. Scenario 1 
Players look at the initial utilities in Table I1 and perhaps, at 
the mediator's suggestion, at the utility functions in Figure 3. From 
Table 11, MEDIATOR displays the car rank orders and utilities shown in 
Table 111. The mediator asks whether players would now like to consider 
compromise or to seek consenses further by exchanging information. In 
scenario 1, we assume that either immediately or after viewing and 
discussing the marginal utility functions (figure 3) but not changing 
them, players are interested in compromise. The mediator can support 
compromise through use of axiomatic solution concepts (Nash, Kalai- 
Smorodinsky, etc.) and/or concession m,~king procedures (Rao-Shakun, 
etc. ) in the MEDIATOR model base --sf:e (Shakun, 1985) for a detailed 
discussion. 
TABLE I11 
As an example, the mediator can suggest concession making following 
conditional car target expansion. Under this procedure each player 
successively expands the list (target) of cars which he would be willing 
to accept. At stage 1,  player 1's car target would be his first choice, . 
Opel, and player 2's his first choice, M230. The intersection of these 
two car targets is empty. Using Table 111, if players continue to 
expand their individual car targets by stages until a nonempty 
intersection is achieved, then concession making will continue to the 
third stage with Opel as the intersection and compromise solution. 
As another attempt at compromise, the mediator can ask MEDIATOR to 
compute the maxmin solution concept. First MEDIATOR normalizes each 
player's utilities between 0 (for his last car choice) and 1 (for his 
first car choice). Using Table 11, for each car the normalized utility 
for each player and minimium utility comparing normalized utilities 
between players are computed and shown in Table IV. 
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TABLE IV 
The car which maximizes the minimum utility giving a maximin 
utility of .77 is Opel which is the maxmin solution. Thus both 
concession making following conditional car target expansion and the 
maxmin solution concept give Opel. 
4.2. Scenario 2 
After looking at the initial utilities in Table I1 and the marginal 
utility functions, Figure 3, players decide to discuss their marginal 
utility functions and modify them to those shown in Figure 4. This 
leads to an evolved group problem representation. Thus, in Table I1 the 
overall utilities evolve from the initial utilities to the first evolved 
utilities. Here consensus on a car decision--Opel--has been achieved 
since Opel gives each player his highest utility. 
FIGURE 4 
4.3. Scenario 3 
In evaluating the results of scenario 2 player 2 realizes that 
although Opel has the highest computed utility, .66, he is not at all 
familiar with this car and so doesn't want to buy it. He prefers M230 
or Volvo which have only utility of .65. Player 1 says that M230 and 
Volvo are low down on his preference list. He suggests P505 as a 
compromise being his second choice (with a utility of .72 and close to 
Opel at .74) and giving player 2 a utility of .63 which is almost high 
as .65 associated by player 2 with M230 and Volvo. The scenario now 
divides into two sub-scenarios. 
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In sub-scenario A, player 2 feels that player 1's proposed 
compromise of P505 is reasonable and accepts it. In sub-scenario B, 
player 2 says that, although player 1's compromise suggestion of P505 is 
reasonable in the light of the first evolved utilities, he now realizes 
something is bothering him about the problem representation. It does 
not include the nationality (country of manufacture) of the cars. He 
would like to assign a preference weight to German cars. Thus, player 2 
has introduced a fifth goal dimension, y5, car nationality, to the group 
problem representation--imagine a column for goal y5 after goal y4 in 
Table I1 where German cars (Opel, Golf, M230, BMW) are assigned a 
nominal value of, say, 2 and all other cars a value of 1. 
Using PREFCALC, player 2 modifies his marginal utility functions to 
those shown by the dotted lines in Figure 5. He places a weight of .1 
on car nationality, y5, and modifies the relative weights on the other 
criteria so that the sum of the weights equals 1. Note with PREFCALC1s 
utility normalization the criterion weight equals the marginal utility 
at the most preferred goal value considered. Player 1 places zero 
weight on car nationality, y5 so that his marginal utilities in Figure 5 
are in effect the same as in Figure 4. 
FIGURE 5 
The marginal utility functions in Figure 5 give overall utilities 
shown under "second evolved utilities" in Table 11. For player 1, there 
is no change--his second evolved utilities are the same to his first 
evolved utilities. For player 2, the second evolved utilities show the 
German Opel with utility .70, the German M230 with .70, the Swedish 
Volvo with .60 and the French P505 with .57. Player 2 still rules out 
the Opel as an unfamiliar car. He now prefers the M230 (utility .TO) 
over the Volvo (.60) whereas before introducing car nationality they 
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were tied at .65 each. While before the P505, at utility .63 was close 
to player 2's first choices of M230 and Volvo each with utility .65, now 
the utility gap between P505 (utility .57) and the first choice M230 
(utility .70) is large so that player 1's compromise suggestion of P505 
represents a large utility drop for player 2 from his first choice. The 
mediator asks MEDIATOR to compute the maxmin solution. Using Table 11, 
for each car MEDIATOR computes the second evolved nomalized utility for 
each player and, comparing these, the minimim utility--see Table V. 
TABLE V 
The maxmin solution is Opel. With player 2 ruling it out, player 1 
argues that P505, as the maximin solution over the remaining cars, is 
fair. Besides he would have to drop to low utility levels of .45 and 
.44 (Table 11) if he were to consider M230 or Volvo, respectively. 
Player 2 is convinced and accepts P505 as the solution. 
5. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE FOR MEDIATOR 
In this section, we describe software requirements and a system 
architecture for MEDIATOR. Basically, MEDIATOR integrates a collection 
of software components used by the players and the human mediator 
through the use of a shared database. The need for analyzing such 
components in a DSS, in addition to the description of operational 
research models, arises from two sources. Any DSS must offer a 
user-friendly interface and efficient data access. Otherwise, it will 
not be used by computer-naive decision makers. More specifically, 
however, a multi-person DSS like MEDIATOR must also facilitate and 
structure the communication among the players and with the human 
mediator. 
One approach to implementing such a communication facility is a 
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direct message exchange subsystem based on electronic mail (Bui and 
Jarke , 1984 1. Another approach --the so-called decision room-- leaves 
the responsibility for player communication outside the system: the 
players are assembled in a single room and can communicate without 
computer aids (Huber, 1982). 
In contrast to these two methods, our approach is 
database-centered. The database-centered approach was introduced for 
single-user DSS by Donovan (1976), and extended to hierarchically 
organized distributed DSS by Jarke (1981, 1982). This paper extends the 
approach further to Negotiation Support Systems. MEDIATOR achieves 
communication mostly through the sharing of data stored in a common 
database. This database would be typically located on a mainframe or on 
a separate file server accessible by all players and by the mediator. 
It contains base data underlying the decision-making process as well as 
intermediate results of the negotiation process -- the sequence of group 
joint problem representations. 
The rules of communication (also called communication protocols 
(Tanenbaum, 198 1 ) ) are implemented through granting different access 
rights to players and mediator. In the following subsections, we first 
motivate this approach by a requirements analysis, and then provide a 
more detailed technical description. As a running example, we shall use 
once more the two-player car buying application. 
5.1. Systems Requirements for MEDIATOR 
MEDIATOR is designed to provide user-friendly interfaces, efficient 
data and model access, and structured communication facilities to both 
the players and the mediator. Systems requirements for MEDIATOR can be 
grouped into two categories. 
The first class of requirements is derived from the method itself. 
Since negotiation is viewed as an evolutionary process of information 
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exchange leading to consensus or compromise, the system has to provide 
efficient support for interactive use by decision makers and mediators 
with limited computer skills. Moreover, the system has to offer at least 
two kinds of representations for information display. A relational 
database system must support the matrix representation needed in the 
detailed display of criteria and utilities vs. alternatives (see Table 
11). Additionally, the systems can present data graphically (e.g., 
piece-wise linear marginal utility functions, see Figure 3 ) .  Finally, 
the system must be able to analyze and present the consequences of 
changes in control space, goal space, and utility space. 
The second class of systems requirements results from some implicit 
assumptions in the proposed method. MEDIATOR has to satisfy these 
assumptions prior to the actual negotiation procedure. The main 
assumption is that of the idea of building a group joint problem 
representation is accepted by players. The remainder of this subsection 
investigates the consequences of this assumption for MEDIATOR'S design 
in detail. The assumption has three facets: a jointly acceptable 
database of underlying facts, Jointly acceptable definitions of 
alternatives, and mutually understood definitions of criteria and 
preferences. 
Jointly acceptable database. The method assumes that the players 
agree on a common underlying set of facts about the domain of decision. 
The example of arms control negotiations shows that such an agreement 
may be very difficult to reach. The players may not even agree on a 
common scope of alternatives for a particular negotiation (e.g., 
strategic vs, Euro-strategic vs. space weapons). Moreover, disagreement 
on the underlying facts is almost certain. Therefore, MEDIATOR allows 
the players to agree that each will use their own data separately, i.e., 
an agreement exists that the players cannot agree on a common set of 
data. This version of the assumption may be the only way to get 
negotiations started if there is deep distrust among the players -- 
witness again arms control negotiations. 
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Jointly acceptable alternative definitions. This assumption 
requires that the players agree on a common definition of the dimensions 
(not necessarily feasible regions) of the control space. We distinguish 
syntactic and semantic disagreements that have to be resolved in pre- 
negotiations. 
Syntactic disagreements involve a different understanding of terms. 
For example, two players may give the same alternative a different name 
(synonyms) or two different alternatives the same name (homonyms). It is 
very important and usually not too difficult to resolve such 
misunderstandings. 
Semantic disagreements involve a different partitioning of the 
control space. Different partitioning may mean varying degree of 
detail, or it may mean completely different dimensions. Disagreement 
often results from differences in knowledge, or from basically 
inconsistent views of the problem. The former is easier to resolve than 
the latter. 
For example, in a car-buying decision one player may distinguish 
cars by their engine type, another one by their make, yet another one by 
their make, model, and version. The obvious solution is to define 
alternatives by combining all suggested partitionings. However, this may 
lead to an intolerably large number of alternatives. It is the task of 
the mediator to assist the players in defining a mutually understandable 
and acceptable, yet manageable set of alternatives. MEDIATOR can help in 
this task using certain concepts of database theory (see Section 5.4). 
Mutually understood criteria a- preference definitions. While the 
previous assumptions concerned the control space, this one involves 
possible misunderstandings in the goal space definition. Of course, the 
method does not require players to use the same criteria. However, it is 
important that the mediator and his support system, MEDIATOR, understand 
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the meaning of criteria, in order to make useful suggestions. Again, 
there may be syntactic or semantic problems. The former involve the 
naming problems of synonyms and homonyms, whereas the latter could mean 
different units of measure, or different ways to compute criteria from 
the available data. 
As an example, one player may compute a criterion 'lspacefl in square 
meters , whereas another one uses "space" or its synonym "roominessu but 
measures it in cubic feet. On the semantic side, both players could 
define "space" as the size of the inner sitting room; then, it would be 
desirable to merge the two criteria. Alternatively, one of the players 
may use "spaceu for the outer size of the car. This could lead to the 
apparent paradox that one player tries to minimize "spacew while the 
other is maximizing it. Clearly, it is appropriate here to rename and 
separate the criteria. 
Each player defines preferences on criteria, e.g., a utility 
preference measure. However, preference measures used by players need 
not be the same. 
As a consequence of these assumptions, MEDIATOR supports a 
two-phase negotiation process. In the first phase, called view 
integration, the human mediator is supported in achieving a joint 
problem representation in the three steps of: database selection, 
alternative definition, and criteria and preference definition. Upon 
successful completion of this phase, the second phase, called 
nxotiation, proceeds as described in sections 3 and 4. 
5.2. Software Capabilities and Components 
An architecture for the MEDIATOR DSS should offer some software 
capabilities to support the systems requirements described in section 
5.1. We shall first review the major components of single-user DSS and 
then propose a specific architecture for MEDIATOR. 
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Each player and the mediator employ a single-user personal DSS 
which has the traditional three components of model management, data 
management, and dialog management (Sprague and Carlson, 1982 ) . For 
MEDIATOR, this single-user DSS is a data-based version of PREFCALC 
(Jacquet-Lagreze, 1985) for the players and an enhanced version for the 
mediator. 
The dialog manager is responsible for effective interaction between 
the DSS and its users, namely each player and the human mediator. It 
provides menu management, screen composition, and graphics as well as 
:.elational representation facilities (Jarke et al., 1984). 
The model manager consists of executable modules together with 
modelling language facilities and execution management. In particular, 
the negotiation models in the mediator DSS allow mappings of user 
changes (or adaptations) in all three spaces (control, goal, and utility 
space ) . 
The d&a manager accesses and maintains the user Is private as well 
as the jointly acceptable mainframe databases. It contains a standard 
DBMS with enhanced data dictionary and view management facilities (Jarke 
et al., 1984; Jelassi, 1985; Jelassi et al., 19851. The "data 
dictionary" stores metadata such as alternative definitions, criteria 
definitions, function definitions, and units of measure. A Itgeneralized 
view processorw helps the user define their personal customized view to 
the underlying database. In particular, alternatives and criterion 
values can be derived automatically from the stored database records and 
their attributes. 
For n players, there are n+l DSS of this nature. In addition, group 
decision (Bui and Jarke, 1984) or negotiation support systems require a 
communications manager to integrate the single-user DSS (Figure 6). In 
MEDIATOR, this is accomplished in the following manner (Figure 7). 
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Each player and the mediator retain their private databases 
typically stored on a personal computer. The jointly acceptable data 
are stored in a common database located on a mainframe or larger 
minicomputer and accessible by all the personal computers. The 
model/method base may contain different tools for each player but they 
share the PREFCALC method. Conceptually, this method could be stored in 
a common model base associated with the common database. From an 
implementation viewpoint, it is more efficient to have copies on each 







After establishing their individual preferences using single-user 
PREFCALC, players transfer their definitions of alternatives and 
criteria, and their matrix and utility function representation to the 
common database. Each player occupies a private section of that database 
which can be only accessed by himself and by the mediator. The mediator 
will then start the process of integrating these personal problem 
problem representations into the group joint problem representation. 
Once this is accomplished, the joint problem representation is 
stored in the publicly accessible area of the common database. From then 
on, the "official" negotiation will only work with the joint 
representation. The players are free to continue using their local 
representation and other decision support tools for personal 
deliberations. 
From a computer science point of view, MEDIATOR'S design poses the 
following research questions. How do we provide: 
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1. e f f i c i e n t  da tabase  a c c e s s  f o r  each p l aye r?  
2. d a t a b a s e  and model base f a c i l i t i e s  t o  suppor t  t h e  mediator?  
3. communication between p l a y e r s  and mediator?  
4.  u s e r  i n t e r f a c e s  f o r  p layers /media tor?  
The fo l lowing  two subsec t ions  a d d r e s s  our s o l u t i o n s  t o  t h e s e  
problems, first f o r  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  p l aye r  DSS, then f o r  t h e  mediator DSS 
and its communication wi th  t h e  p layer  DSS. 
5.3. DSS o f  t h e  Ind iv jdua l  P l aye r s  
The DSS of t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  p l a y e r s  are based on a s tand-a lone  
v e r s i o n  of PREFCALC (Jacquet-Lagreze, 1985). PREFCALC is a s i n g l e - u s e r  
DSS implemented on a persona l  computer; its under ly ing  a lgo r i t hms  have 
a l r e a d y  been descr ibed  i n  Sec t ion  2. The method assumes its inpu t  t o  be 
s t o r e d  i n  a r e l a t i o n a l  format where t h e  r eco rds  (rows o f  t h e  m a t r i x )  
correspond t o  a l t e r n a t i v e s  and t h e  columns t o  cri teria.  The t a b l e  
e n t r i e s  are c r i t e r i o n  va lues .  
I n  earlier work ( J a r k e  e t  a l . ,  1984; Jelassi, 1985; Jelassi e t  a l . ,  
1985) ,  we enhanced t h e  system wi th  u se r - f r i end ly  c a p a b i l i t i e s  t o  ( a )  
a c c e s s  e x t e r n a l  mainframe da t abases ,  ( b )  d e f i n e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  from sets  , 
of  r e c o r d s  r a t h e r  than from s i n g l e  r e c o r d s ,  and ( c )  use  composi te  
cri teria computed from s t o r e d  a t t r i b u t e s  by user-def ined o r  s e l e c t e d  
func t ions .  The fo l lowing  d e s c r i p t i o n  is based on ( J a r k e  e t  a l . ,  1984).  
F igure  8 shows how t h e  PREFCALC i n p u t  is genera ted  from t h e  
da t abase  . The method starts from a set of  ALTERNATIVES, each  
c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by a number of  p r o p e r t i e s  o r  a t t r i b u t e s .  For example, i n  
a car-buying example t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  are types  o f  cars and t h e  base  
r e l a t i o n  would c o n t a i n  r e l e v a n t  a t t r i b u t e s  such as "maximum speed",  
" f u e l  consumption a t  speed 120 km/hw, e t c .  However, t h e  s t o r e d  r e l a t i o n  
may d i f f e r e n t i a t e  t h e  type of c a r  i n  many more c l a s s e s  t han  needed f o r  
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t h e  d e c i s i o n .  Thus, a d e c i s i o n  a l t e r n a t i v e  may correspond t o  a set of  
s e v e r a l  da tabase  records .  
Some (bu t  no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  a l l )  o f  t h e  a t t r i b u t e s  o f  t h e  da t abase  
r e c o r d s  may be important  t o  a p a r t i c u l a r  u s e r ' s  d e c i s i o n  problem. The 
a t t r i b u t e s  i n  t h i s  s u b s e t  are used as CRITERIA. However, t h e  u se r  may 
a l s o  wish t o  d e r i v e  more complex c r i t e r i a  from t h e  s t o r e d  a t t r i b u t e s ,  o r  
a sk  f o r  a p r e s e n t a t i o n  i n  d i f f e r e n t  u n i t s  o f  measure (e .g . ,  ho r se  powers 
i n s t e a d  of k i l o w a t t s ) .  Therefore ,  some computation may be necessary  t o  
d e r i v e  c r i t e r i a  from t h e  s t o r e d  d a t a .  
Both t a s k s  ( a l t e r n a t i v e  and c r i t e r i a  d e f i n i t i o n s )  are accomplished 
by t h e  afore-mentioned "gene ra l i zed  view processor"  i n  conjunc t ion  wi th  
a menu i n t e r f a c e  gene ra to r .  The r e s u l t i n g  u se r  view is c a l l e d  t h e  
DECISION MATRIX. I n  o rde r  t o  c r e a t e  a d e c i s i o n  ma t r ix ,  t h e  u se r  h a s  t o  
d e f i n e  --through a sequence o f  menus-- how d e c i s i o n  a l t e r n a t i v e s  and 
d e c i s i o n  c r i t e r i a  are de r ived  from t h e  under ly ing  da tabase .  
A l t e r n a t i v e s  are de f ined  i n  two s t e p s .  I n  t h e  d a t a  stap;ing s t e p ,  
t h e  u se r  s e l e c t s  a s u b s e t  o r  CATEGORY o f  a l t e r n a t i v e s  t o  be cons idered .  
For example, i n  a c a r  buying a p p l i c a t i o n ,  t h e  u se r  may be i n t e r e s t e d  
on ly  i n  t r u c k s  bu t  no t  i n  o t h e r  t ypes  o f  cars. Data s t a g i n g  e x t r a c t s  
d a t a  from one o r  more mainframe da t abases  and c o n s t r u c t s  from them a 
s i n g l e  s e l e c t e d  s u b r e l a t i o n  ( t h e  CATEGORY) on which a l l  f u r t h e r  
process ing  w i l l  be performed, u s ing  t h e  microcomputer DSS da t abase .  
Users may e i t h e r  choose from a menu o f  ca tegory  names de f ined  i n  t h e  
CATEGORY DEFINITIONS s e c t i o n  o f  t h e  d a t a  d i c t i o n a r y ,  o r  d e f i n e  t h e i r  own 
ca tegory  v i a  a d i s t r i b u t e d  da t abase  query. 
I n  t h e  grsgihg s t e p ,  t h e  u s e r  chooses a grouping o f  da t abase  
r eco rds  wi th in  t h e  CURRENT CATEGORY r e l a t i o n  such t h a t  each group 
c o n s t i t u t e s  an  ALTERNATIVE. Groups are de f ined  by common va lues  of 
c e r t a i n  a t t r i b u t e s  ( t h e  ALT-NAME). For example, some p l aye r  may be 
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interested in distinguishing cars only by their make and model, but not 
by details such as number of doors, engine power, etc. 
Criteria are derived from attributes of the database records. In 
the simplest case, an attribute value can directly serve as a criterion 
value (e.g., maximum speed). Frequently, however, the criterion value 
may be a function of one or several attribute values. For example, a 
criterion "consumptionff may be defined as the average of the stored 
database values of fuel consumption in the city and on highways. 
Moreover, whenever alternatives correspond to groups of records 
rather than to single records, criterion values must be based on 
aggregate functions over these records (e.g., average, minimum, maximum, 
forecast for next year). The data dictionary contains a library of such 
CRITERIA DEFINITIONS from which the user can choose the CURRENT 
CRITERIA, using a menu of CRIT-NAMES. (Of course, a more sophisticated 
user can also add functions to the library.) 
Finally, the combination of alternative definitions (grouping) and 
criteria definitions (computations) allows the derivation of criterion 
values for alternatives (CRIT-VALUE) from the database. All of the 
above operations can be performed within an extended relational database 
framework discussed in detail in (Jarke et al., 1984; Jelassi 1985). 
Figure 9 gives an example of decision matrix construction for 
player 2 in the example of section 4. This player wants to use the car 
mostly in the city and is therefore interested in a spacious but not too 
expensive car with little consumption in the city. This player ignores 
other known car characteristics (e.g., speed, number of doors, etc.); 
moreover, the database consulted by player 2 contains only information 
about the DIN consumption. Player 2 is not interested very much in the 
differences among different versions of a car but rules out sports 
versions (e.g., the Golf GTI in the example table). Note, that the 
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After the construction of the input matrix, the CATEGORY relation 
will be needed only if the multi-criteria decision method proposes the 
inclusion of a new criterion in order to resolve apparent 
inconsistencies in user preferences. Otherwise, the method proceeds to 
construct utility functions through aggregation and disaggregation of 
preferences, as described in Section 2 (see also Jacquet-Lagreze and 
Shakun ( 1984 ) ) . 
5.4. DSS of the Mediator 
In the previous subsection, it was demonstrated that a minor 
extension of the relational model of databases (Codd, 1970; Ullman, 
1982) is sufficient to support the single-player data preparation 
process for the multiple criteria DSS, PREFCALC. In this subsection, 
this result will be extended. Relational operations, enhanced by 
redefinitions of terms, can also efficiently support the view 
integration phase of mediation. The discussion will follow the same 
.- - 
sequence (database selection, alternative definition, criteria and 
preference definition) as before. Subsequently, we review the mediation 
support tools used in the negotiation phase. 
The first task in establishing a group joint problem representation 
is the choice of underlying databases upon which the definition and 
evaluation of alternatives can be based. In general, the mediator will 
have to start with the union of all such databases as far as they are 
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made available to him. In this case, it is crucial to establish the 
logical relationships between different sources of information about the 
same entity. For example, one catalog may refer to cars by make, model, 
version, etc., another one by product number. A translation table must 
be used to permit a join among the different entity identifiers. This 
task may be complicated if no 1-to-1 mapping exists; in this case, the 
least common superset must be constructed to permit mappings. In most 
intraorganizational negotiations, however, the database selection step 
will be simple because players access the same organizational 
(mainframe) databases to begin with. 
The database selection step establishes a logical view of the 
mainframe databases as a large "universal relation" (Ullman, 1982). 
From this, the group joint CATEGORY relation can be easily defined. As 
mentioned in Section 3, either the union (if there are few feasible 
alternatives) or the intersection (if there are many group-feasible 
alternatives) of the individual CATEGORY relations can be chosen as the 
joint representation. In a relational query language, this means that 
the individual CURRENT CATEGORY definitions are simply conjunctions and 
disjunctions of restriction predicates. 
Next, the individual ALTERNATIVES definitions must be integrated. 
Since the group CURRENT CATEGORY relation contains all the attributes of 
the individual CURRENT CATEGORY relations, grouping will simply use all 
grouping attributes of the individual ALTERNATIVES definitions 
simultaneously. Unfortunately, this solution may result in very long 
alternative names and a large number of alternatives to be considered. 
For example, if one player distinguishes cars by their maximal speed, 
another one by their make, and a third one by make, model, and version, 
a particular group alternative could be named: "180-190 km/h, 
~ercedes(user2), Mercedes(user3), M190, EN. 
The concept of a "functional dependencyt1 as developed by database 
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theory (see, e.g., (Ullman, 1982)), can be exploited to simplify this 
naming problem. A database attribute is called functionally dependent 
on a set of other database attributes if for each combination of values 
of these attributes, the dependent attribute can assume at most one 
value, Obviously, each attribute is functionally dependent on itself. 
Therefore, the first simplification is to unify the two occurences of 
ttMercedes" (provided both players mean the same thing -- this, the 
mediator DSS can test by looking at the databases and groupings used by 
both players ) . 
Assume that the database schema in the data dictionary also states 
that maximal speed is functionally dependent on make, model, and 
version; e . ,  for each version of a car, there is only one maximal 
speed. In this case, MEDIATOR can automatically simplify the group joint 
alternative grouping to make, model, and version. The simplified example 
alternative name then becomes just "Mercedes MlgO E". For the sake of 
player 1 ,  maximal speed will be retained as a criterion (but not as an 
alternative name) in the decision matrix. 
If such automatic simplification proves insufficient, the human 
mediator will make other suggestions. One option was already mentioned: 
reducing the set of alternatives by presenting only the intersection- 
feasible ones. (In a many-player situation, the requirement of mutual 
feasibility can be relaxed to, e.g., "acceptable to at least 50%tt, 
etc.). As another option, consider the case of different degree of 
specialization among the players. If the large number of alternatives is 
created by varying degree of detail (i.e., one alternative definition is 
a subset of the other), the mediator may suggest postponing the decision 
about detailed alternatives until after a preselection of "goodtt higher- 
level alternatives. 
Next, the group joint criteria definitions (columns of the group 
decision matrix) must be established. This step starts formally by 
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executing a relational join operation over all the player's decision 
matrices understood as derived relations. The join columns are the 
alternative names as established in the previous step. This will result 
in a preliminary version of the group decision matrix in which the 
alternative names are common to all players but all criteria are 
disjunct. This means: players are assumed to assign weights of 0 to all 
columns but those steming from their own decision matrix. If there are 
n players each with m criteria, there will be nm criteria in the 
preliminary group decision matrix. 
The mediator will now try to collapse criteria that appear more 
than once and to unify similar criteria. In section 5.1, we have already 
illustrated the pitfalls. The function definitions stored in the 
CRITERIA DEFINITION section of the players' data dictionaries are the 
major MEDIATOR tool to assist in criteria integration. If the function 
definitions of two criteria are equal, proportional (possibly different 
units of measure), or reciprocal there is a good chance that two 
criteria mean the same thing (respectively one is the negation of the 
other), even if they have different names. 
By contrast, if criteria have the same name but differ 
significantly in their function definition, they may mean different 
things. An indicator of such semantic disagreements may be the marginal 
utility functions of the players. Therefore, MEDIATOR offers overlay of 
marginal utility curves for any pair (or small group) of players. 
Usually, one would expect that utility curves of players for the same 
criterion differ in weight and steepness but they will rarely cross (one 
monotonically increasing, the other one decreasing). If they do cross, 
this may mean severe value disagreements, or simply misunderstanding of 
terms. 
Human mediator intervention to resolve such questions remains 
necessary even in the presence of an NSS. Looking at the function 
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definitions alone, it may be very difficult or even impossible to prove 
or disprove equivalence of functions (even though the form of the 
function definitions in our SQL extension are very standardized). 
Therefore, the integration step will only be supported but not 
completely automated. 
Once the alternatives and criteria have been integrated as far as 
appropriate, MEDIATOR constructs the group joint problem representation 
using the player's preference information. 
As an example, consider the view integration process preceeding the 
negotiations described in section 4. In contrast to player 2 who wanted 
a city car, player 1 wants to use the ear mostly for business trips, He 
is therefore initially interested in highway consumption, high speed, a 
limited price, and much space. His database has more detailed 
information on consumption at various speeds but is otherwise identical 
to that of player 2. In the first step of view integration, both 
players agree to use the intersection of the two sets of acceptable 
cars, ruling out sports versions which were not acceptable to player 2. 
Both players name one of their criteria "consumptionw but a review of 
the criteria definitions by MEDIATOR reveals that one means the DIN 
consumption, the other one the highway consumption. Since both measures 
are highly correlated, and player 1's business trips will account for 
most of the kilometers anyway, the players agree in the criteria 
integration phase to work on the basis of highway consumption, and to 
call this criterion C120. The criterion, space, has identical 
definitions in both decision matrices and will simply be merged. Based 
on this information, both players reconsider their utility evaluations 
and come up with the initial group joint problem representation shown in 
Table 11. 
An interesting design question for negotiation support systems in 
general arises after the view integration. In which form should the 
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result be fed back to the players? MEDIATOR'S answer was chosen for 
reasons of simplicity: the same view of the joint problem 
representation is offered to all players. 
Alternatively, one could try to adapt the joint representation to 
each player's language, i.e., trying to attempt to translate the global 
view back to the individual view as far as possible. Database theory has 
shown the impossibility to do this automatically; however, practical 
ways around this problem have also been devised (Furtado and Casanova, 
1985). However, these methods are very difficult to implement. Moreover, 
it is not clear from an application standpoint whether this solution is 
even desirable -- consider, e.g., a second channel of communication 
among the players which might result in considerable confusion unless a 
common language is enforced. 
The remaining MEDIATOR tools support the human mediator in the 
actual negotiation phase as described in Section 3. The implementation 
of the comprehensive example presented in section 4 is based on the 
group joint problem representation as just developed. Here, we just 
summarize the major software tools grouped by the problem space in which 
they apply. We do not consider behavioral tools such as Delphi, NGT, 
etc.; for an overview, see (Bui and Jarke, 1984), (DeSanctis and 
Callupe , 1984), or (Huber , 1984). 
MEDIATOR allows the human mediator to perform what-if analyses of 
possible suggestions he might make. Before, e.g., suggesting that 
players should lower their utility threshold, the mediator must make 
certain that this will generate additional alternatives for discussion. 
Otherwise, the players will feel that they made a concession for nothing 
and the climate of the negotiation may deteriorate. 
In the contra space, the relational query language offers the 
option of including or excluding sets of alternatives from consideration 
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by certain attribute or criterion values. The mediator can apply such 
queries either directly at the level of the DECISION MATRIX (usually to 
make it smaller) or at the level of the group CURRENT CATEGORY relation 
(usually to increase the set of feasible alternatives that appear in the 
DECISION MATRIX). The same technique may be applied either to the 
reference set of alternatives presented to the users, or to the CATEGORY 
as a whole. 
Changes in the goal sp_ace involve a redefinition of the set of 
CURRENT CRITERIA, either by adding or by deleting CRIT-NAMES from the 
DECISION MATRIX. Since the mediator DSS has full access to the group 
CURRENT CATEGORY relation, such changes can usually be effected without 
re-computing the whole DECISION MATRIX or re-accessing the mainframe 
databases. Suppressing a criterion may even be done by the dialog 
manager, without changing the internal representation at all. 
Before a change in the goal space is made, the mediator will 
frequently be interested in the importance of criteria. Would dropping a 
criterion change the ratings? Is the ranking by a particular criterion 
inconsistent with the overall utility ranking of alternatives? To answer 
such questions, certain display techniques for relational data are 
employed, most prominently alternative ranking by some criterion. 
The idea of ranking alternatives is also used to answer what-if 
questions in the &i&it_y s e e .  Since player utilities are simply 
additional attributes of the DECISION MATRIX relation, they can be 
easily used as sorting criteria. Alternatives can be presented ordered 
by a particular player's utility either down to a certain rank ("present 
the five best alternatives for player 1") or down to a certain minimal 
utility ("present all alternatives above normalized player 1 utility 
-50"). This facility is already offered by PREFCALC for a single 
player. See section 4 for an example of the display of two players' 
utility rank orders in concession making. For more than two players, it 
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may also make sense to display the aggregated utilities of certain 
coalitions. 
The second representational tool at the utility level involves the 
overlayed marginal utility curves. What-if questions allow the mediator 
to vary the weights and numbers of linear pieces of each player 
tentatively. As stated before, all of these what-if studies are 
intended to prevent having the player's agree to useless concessions and 
redefinitions that would unnecessarily delay the decision process and 
destroy the trust of players in the mediator's (and in the DSS's) 
abilities. An underlying assumption made in this context is that players 
are actually interested in a fast decision while preserving their 
interest -- an assumption that is usually justified in 
intraoriganizational negotiations but may not hold in other cases. 
In summary, the tools described here are mostly database and 
display tools, related to the algorithms presented in Section 3. Other 
mathematical or behavioral tools may also be needed but their discussion 
would go beyond the scope of this paper; see (Shakun, 1985) for a 
detailed presentation of axiomatic and concession-making procedures. 
Once the human mediator has formed an opinion from the what-if 
analyses, he broadcasts messages to the players either directly or by 
notifying them of proposed changes tentatively made on the group problem 
representation. Broadcasting messages keeps the mediation process as 
unbiased and open as possible. (Our underlying hypothesis is that 
players may discontinue the use of MEDIATOR if it means loss of 
information to them.) Examples of such changes are: changes in the 
joint set of alternatives; introduction of new criteria or changes in 
weights; areas where concessions of players may reduce differences in 
opinion; and changes in utility values. 
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6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The system design for MEDIATOR supports building a group joint 
problem representation (view integration). Negotiation involves the 
evolution of this problem representation--consensus seeking -- within 
which compromise is possible. At any stage of problem representation, 
the mediator can support compromise through use of axiomatic solution 
concepts and/or concession-making procedures in the MEDIATOR model base. 
With systems like MEDIATOR we are moving towards decision support 
sytems for multiplayer, multicriteria, ill-structured, dynamic problems, 
thus implementing in a decision support context the methodology of 
evolutionary systems design (ESD)--policy making under complexity. 
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Output Output solution point 
goa 1 whose input in A. is 
dimension the buying decision. 
Output goal dimension 
or criterion ~ ~ = g ~ ( a )  
Figure 1, Output, Goal or Criteria Space 
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player 2' 
utility, 
0 ~ 0  player 1's utility, ul 
Figure 2. Utility Space For Two Players 
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Fig. 3 Initial Marginal Utility Functions for Player 1 (Solid) 
and for Player 2 (Dotted). 
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Figure 4. First Evolved Marginal Utility Functions for Player 1 (Solid) 
and for Player 2 (Dotted). 
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Figure 5. Second Evolved Marginal Utility Functions for Plaver I ( ~ n I i A 1  
and for Player 2 (Dotted). 
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FIGURE 6: General NSS Structure -- Players' and Mediator's DSS 
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FIGURE 7: MEDIATOR Design -- Communication through Data Sharing 
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FIGURE 8: Data Extraction in MEDIATOR (simplified from (Jarke et al., 1984)) 
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1) Player 2 decides to look at subcompacts only. A category tfsubcompacttt has 
been previously defined for the "carsM mainframe database as follows: 
DEFINE CATEGORY subcompact FOR cars 
WHERE length < 480; 
The player can invoke this category simply by menu selection: 
CURRENT CATEGORY: subcompact 
make model version DIN- Length Width Price Speed ... 
Cons 
..................................................................... 
Ope1 Record 2000 11.4 462 173 46700 176 
Peugeot 505 GR 9.4 458 172 49500 173 
Peugeot 104 ZS 8.7 337 152 35200 161 
Citroen Dyane 6.8 387 150 24800 117 
Citroen Visa Super E 9.2 369 154 32100 142 
VW Golf GLS 9.7 398 158 39150 148 
V W Golf GTI 11.2 398 158 45000 181 * 
Mercedes 230 E 13.6 472 179 75700 180 
Citroen CX PALLAS 14.1 465 177 64700 178 
Citroen CX GT I 15.3 465 177 69700 178 * 
Volvo 244 GLE 16.9 479 171 51000 140 + 
Volvo 244 TURBO 12.5 479 171 59000 150 + 
BMW 520 12.5 46 2 170 68593 182 
... 
..................................................................... 
2) Player 2 does not like "GTItt sports versions and therefore adds the 
following category definition to the CATEGORIES model base: 
DEFINE CATEGORY no-sport FOR subcompact 
WHERE version <> ItGTIW; 
the application of which eliminates the rows marked 'St. 
3) Player 2 is not interested in "lengthtt and "width" of the car but 
only in the "spacett it provides. The CRITERIA DEFINITIONS model 
base contains the definition of a virtual attribute "spacett: 
DEFINE CRITERION space FOR cars 
AS avg(length*width) 
which is inherited by all subrelations of cars and can again be applied 
by simple menu selection. avg(x) is a "vertical" function that computes 
the average value of x over all rows in a particular alternative 
(as defined in step 4, below). 
FIGURE 9: GENERATING A PROBLEM REPRESENTATION FOR PLAYER 2 
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4) Player 2 is not interested in the differences between the different 
versions but wants to define alternatives only via make and model 
(as shown in the GROUP-BY below). Therefore, the two rows marked '+'  
must be combined into one. In order to do this, player 2 defines the 
DECISION-MATRIX as follows (again, MEDIATOR uses menu selection to 
make this process more user-friendly): 
DEFINE VIEW decision-matrix (make, model, consumption, space, price) 
AS SELECT make, model, avg(D1N-cons), space, avg(price) 
FROM no-spor ts 
GROUP-BY make, model 
which results in the following decision matrix for Player 2: 
make model Consumption Space Price 
............................................. 
Ope1 Record 11.4 7.96 46700 
Peugeot 505 9.4 7.88 49500 
Peugeot 104 8.7 5.11 35200 
Citroen Dyane 6.8 5.81 24800 
Citroen Visa 9.2 5.65 32100 
V W Golf 9.7 6.15 39150 
Mercedes 230 13.6 8.47 75700 
Citroen CX 14.1 8.06 64700 
Volvo 244 14.7 8.38 55000 
BMW 520 12.5 7.81 68593 
FIGURE 9: GENERATING A PROBLEM REPRESENTATION FOR PLAYER 2 (cont.) 
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TABLE I 
GROUP RELATIONAL REPRESENTATION (REVERSE UTILITIES) 
CORRESPONDING TO FIGURES 1 AND 2 
control goal goal goal goal initial 
make model Y Y Y Y utilities 
1 2 3 4 U U 











Record 10.48 7.96 
505 10.07 7.88 
104 8.42 5.11 
Dyane 6.75 5.87 
Visa 7.30 5.65 
Golf 9.61 6.15 
230 10.40 8.47 
CX 11.05 8.06 
244 12.95 8.38 
520 12.26 7.81 
TABLE I1 
GROUP PROBLEM REPRESENTATION 
First Second 
control control goal goal goal goal initial evolved evolved 
make model Y Y Y Y utilities utilities utilities 
1 2 3 4 
U u u U u U 
C120 Space Price Speed 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Ope1 Record 10.48 7.96 
Peugeot 505 10.01 7.88 
Peugeot 104 8.42 5.11 
Citroen Dyane 6.75 5.81 
Citroen Visa 7.30 5.65 
V W Golf 9.61 6.15 
Mercedes 230 10.40 8.47 
Citroen CX 11.05 8.06 
Volvo 244 12.95 8.38 
BMW 520 12.26 7.81 
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TABLE 111 


























































































EVOLVED NORMALIZED UTILITIES 
Player 1 Player . 2 Minimum 1 Utilites 
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